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The issue Ruth Chadwick addresses is her paper is an important and interesting one. Until 
recently, while medicine as a profession was guided by a “service” ideal, the moral ideal of 
biologists (and others scientists) was more or less oriented towards free enquiry and scientific 
creativity. Although they tended to see themselves as serving societal interests in the longer 
run, their agendas were oriented towards biological questions rather than towards societal 
demands.  
 
In other words, the moral profile of biology as a scientific endeavour was fleshed out on two 
levels. On the one hand (on the macro-level), biologists were guided by a general ethic of 
science: in the longer run, science will prove beneficial to human society, one way or 
another. In the meantime (on the micro-level), we will conduct our research in a careful and 
responsible manner, but we will postpone the question how precisely our research efforts will 
contribute to solving societal problems. This moral stratification is still clearly noticeable for 
participants in research ethics committees, for example ethics committees on research with 
animals. A research protocol is expected to point out its societal objectives, but these tend to 
be formulated in rather general terms, as goals to be met somewhere in the future, through an 
accumulation of research efforts. The scientific objectives, on the other hand, are usually 
formulated much more precisely. As a rule, it is difficult to determine how exactly the 
concrete scientific targets are expected to contribute to the societal objectives, so broadly 
defined. For example, although researchers may expect that by identifying the function of a 
particular gene they will develop a tool for treating particular forms of cancer, their research 
project is likely to be a rather small step in a complicated series of scientific events. In other 
words, although the research does not take place in a moral or societal vacuum, the societal 
objective is defined to broadly that it still allows the scientists involved to design their 
experiments solely in accordance with scientific interests, methods and agenda’s. 
 
As Ruth Chadwick points out, however, the field is changing. In the genomics era, a broad 
array of scientific disciplines has become involved in large-scale research programs intended 
to address a variety of societal problems. This means that the service ideal, to a certain extent 
at least, has “moved upstream” (p. 194). Not only in the sense that biologists increasingly have 
to be able to explain much more clearly how they expect to link their massive fundamental 
research activities with beneficial applications, but also in the sense that societal 
communication has adopted the ideal of dialogue, of public engagement. From the very 
outset, it is argued, the public should become involved in defining agenda’s for large-scale 
scientific programs. 
 
Until recently, the claim that “the public” should have a say in the process of designing 
research agendas tended to be countered by the claim that scientific progress is by definition 
unpredictable. One cannot tell beforehand how the process of knowledge production will 
evolve. But now that the scientists themselves have so massively agreed to develop large-scale 
programs that are in fact more or less rigorously managed and planned, the argument that 
science is capricious and unpredictable is no longer convincing. If it is possible to gear 
individual research activities to common agendas and objectives, these common objectives 
might be defined in such a way that they can be expected to serve urgent societal demands. 
And this makes public engagement a viable ideal, at least in principle.  
 
This applies to all three levels (What can I know? What ought I to do? What can I hope for?). 
On the knowledge level, it is certainly true that the number of genes in the human genome 
does not directly settle the issue of genetic determinism. Nonetheless, it is clear that both in 
scientific circles and in the public domain, due to the human genome project (notably the 
unexpected outcome that the human genome contains something like 22.500 genes) genetic 
determinism has lost much of its credibility. The debate continues, but although genetic 
determinism is not dead, it is certainly on the defensive. A system-oriented approach has 
spread through the research community, at the expense of genetic determinism. In the public 
realm, the logic of gene-hunting is still very much alive, but I think (or at least hope) it will 
be a matter of time before the mass media will learn to speak a more sophisticated language.    
 
On the level of ethics (the “ought”-level), Ruth Chadwick rightly points out that the 
traditional division of labour between scientists (whose job was said to merely consist in 
producing new forms of knowledge) and others (policy makers and/or the general public) 
who should determine the use to which these forms of knowledge should be put, is no longer 
convincing. The pursuit of knowledge is not value free, and the framing of issues by scientists 
will often have a substantial impact on public debate and policy development. Indeed, the 
shift from the individual to the public health level, from the I to the We that is noticeable in 
contemporary bioethical debate (as indicated by Ruth Chadwick in her paper), is not a 
development that was initiated solely by ethicists. On the contrary, this shift already set in as 
scientists started to frame and reframe their research projects. 
 
As far as the level of hope is concerned, I already pointed out that the emergence of large-
scale researched programs, more or less rigorously managed and planned, is important here. 
This development makes it logically possible for the public to have a say in agenda-
development. Indeed, if agenda-setting on such a grand scale proves possible, the next 
question is inevitable as well: who will be allowed to defines these agendas and on what 
grounds? In theory it would be possible to identify, say, the ten most pressing societal 
problems of the present in order (through backcasting) to gear evolving research programs 
towards solving them. Agenda-setting would then become something of a dialogue. Rather 
than allowing the scientists themselves to determine what is desirable and possible, agenda-
setting would become an interactive process and science would become “infected” with the 
service ideal. But such a process will have winners and losers, stakeholders who will and 
stakeholders who will not able to call public attention to their interests. In other words, I 
agree with Ruth Chadwick’s conclusion that in the genomics era public engagement is at least 
logically possible on all three levels. The challenge, however, will be to design fair and 
effective means to organize a process of public engagement in such a way that the hazards of 
“abandonment”, of de-listing orphan diseases from the societal agenda for research can be 
fairly addressed. 
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